Landmark Decision: Bombay High Court Strikes Down Rule 6(1) of 2020 Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Signalling Shift in Consumer Rights Landscape

Landmark Decision: Bombay High Court Strikes Down Rule 6(1) of 2020 Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Signalling Shift in Consumer Rights Landscape

Landmark Decision: Bombay High Court Strikes Down Rule 6(1) of 2020 Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Signalling Shift in Consumer Rights Landscape

The pivotal question at hand revolves around whether the recent judgment from the Honourable High Court of Maharashtra, Pune bench, will nullify the entire selection committee process for appointing 112 Presidents/Members of Consumer Commissions in the state.

Reference Case: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Writ Petition No. 3680/2023 Dr.Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye & others vs

  1. Union of India, Through its Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Department of Consumer Affairs, Krushi Bhavan, New Delhi.
  2. State of Maharashtra, Through its Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Department/Ministry, Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.

Dr Prem Lata, Legal Head VOICE

Facts & Relief sought in writs: WPs 3680, 2107 & 2496-23

These writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India –

  • Seek to raise a challenge to Rule 6(1) and Rule 10(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 (Qualification for Appointment, method of recruitment, Procedure for appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission).
  • A declaration has also been sought that the petitioners who were the members at various District Commissions are eligible for re-appointment to the post of member of the District Commission under Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 2020.

Two Issues: Writ Petition No. 2107 of 2023

Writ Petition No. 2107 of 2023 has been preferred by Members at District Commissions in the State of Maharashtra. Besides raising challenging to

  • Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020
  • The provisions of Rule 10(2) of the said Rules are challenged to the extent the tenure of the District Commission is restricted to a period of four years.
  • The petitioners seek a declaration that they are eligible for being considered for re-appointment to the post of member on the basis of earlier successfully completed the process of selection which included written examination and interview as per the Rules prevailing then.

Similar issue: Writ Petition No. 2496 of 2023

  • Writ Petition No. 2496 of 2023 filed by the petitioners who were functioning as President/members of District Commissions in the State of Maharashtra.
  • Seek a declaration that they are eligible for being considered for re-appointment to the post of President/Members of the District Commission on the basis of having completed the process of selection including written examination and interview as per the prevailing rules.

Common Judgment passed in WPs 3680, 2107 & 2496-23 

Issue 1: Dominance of executives over Judicial Person, chairman

(Writ 3680 of 2023) Challenge to Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020:

Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020 reads as under:-

“6 Procedure of appointment. — (1) The President and Members of the State Commission and the District Commission shall be appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee, consisting of the following persons, namely:-

(a) Chief Justice of the High Court or any Judge of the High

Court nominated by him-Chairperson;

(b) Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the State

Government – Member;

(c) Nominee of the Chief Secretary of the State – Member.”

According to the said provision, the President and the Members of the State Commission and the District Commission can be appointed by the State Government on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The constitution of the Selection Committee consisting of two members from the Executive as the Secretary in-charge of the Consumer Affairs and a nominee of the Chief Secretary of the State, the doctrine of separation of powers is violated. In the light of the law laid down in these decisions, it is the contention of the petitioners that Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020 compromises the aspect of primacy to the judiciary in the Selection.

Hence HC HELD –

  • Rule 6(1) invalid and the notifications dated 10.04.2023 and 13.06.2023 would not survive. They are accordingly quashed.in the light of earlier decided case by the SC in the matter of Rojer Mathew Versus South Indian Bank Limited & Others [(2020) 6

SCC 1],

  • Madras Bar Association (M.B.A. III) Versus Union of India &

Another [(2021) 7 SCC 369] and

  • Madras Bar Association (M.B.A. IV) Versus Union of India & Another [2021 SCC OnLine SC 463].

Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020 has been struck down, the notifications dated 10.04.2023 and 13.06.2023 would not survive. They are accordingly quashed.

Issue 2: Tenure and re-appointment of members /president

(Writ 2017 of 2023 & Writ Petition No. 2496 of 2023)

Challenge to Rule 10(2) as regards tenure of four years:

Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 2020 has been challenged to the extent the tenure of Office of Member of the State Commission as well as President and Member of the District Commission has been restricted for a term of four years or up to the age of 65 years whichever is earlier. Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 2020 reads as under:

“10. Term of Office of President or Member. –

Every member of the State Commission and the President and every member of the District Commission shall hold office for a term of four years or up to the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier and shall be eligible for reappointment for another term of four years subject to the age limit of sixty-five years, and such reappointment shall be made on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Committee.”

Held

  • Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 2020 to the extent it prescribes the tenure of the Members of the State Commission and the President and members of the District Commission to be four years is struck down as not being in consonance with the spirit of the law laid down in the Madras Bar Association III (supra).

Issue 3: Applicability of Rule 8(18) in re-appointment cases

Plea taken in these cases is that Rule 8(18) of the said rules indicates aspects to be taken into consideration by the Selection Committee while making recommendation for reappointment and the confidential reports, disposal of cases, performance during the first appointment, general reputation of a candidate be considered.

It is to be noted that Rule 6(9) of the Rules of 2020 empowering the Selection Committee to determine its procedure for making its recommendation has been struck down by this Court in Vijaykumar Bhima Dighe (supra) which judgment has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As a result Rule 6(9) of the Rules presently does not find place in the statute book. As a result there is no power with the Selection Committee to determine its procedure for making its recommendation in the matter of appointments to the post of Members of the State Commission including re-appointment cases. In other words, Selection Committee presently cannot determine its procedure for making its recommendations in the matter of appointment either fresh or re-appointment.

Issue 4: Validity of advertisement dated 23.05.2023

Plea taken: The advertisement dated 23.05.2023 is under challenge on the ground that the Hon’ble Supreme Court while issuing directions under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in The Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs (supra) had directed holding of written test consisting of two papers. Since department has not followed the direction of SC, advertisement dated 23.05.2023 is to be declared invalid.

Background

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that till suitable amendments were made in the Rules of 2020, directions were being issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India that the appointment of President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission

should be made on the basis of performance in the written test consisting of two papers as indicated. The said direction reads as under:-

Paper-I (a) General knowledge and current affairs

(b) Knowledge of Constitution of India

(c) Knowledge of various Consumers related Laws as indicated in the Schedule (Objective Type)

Paper-II (a) One Essay on topics chosen from issues on trade and commerce consumer related issues or Public Affairs.

(b) One case study of a consumer case for testing the abilities of analysis and cogent drafting of orders (descriptive type)

The Department’s notice specifically outlines the details for Paper-II. According to the notice, Paper-II includes an essay question where candidates are required to attempt two topics—one must be answered in English, and the other in Marathi. Similarly, in the case study section, candidates are expected to attempt two case studies, with one being in English and the other in Marathi.

  • Be noted that under Section 101(2)(n) of the Act of 2019 the Central Government has been empowered to make rules with regard to qualifications for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure for appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of President and members of the District Commission under Section 29 of the Act of 2019. There is no power conferred on the State Government to prescribe the mode of recruitment.
  • Moreover, the Honourable Supreme Court, through directives exercised under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has outlined the protocol for the conduction of the written test comprising two papers. The specific prescription of one essay and one case study for Paper-II has been articulated. Consequently, it is asserted that the Department exceeds its authority and jurisdiction by imposing additional requirements beyond the directives established under Article 142. These directions do not empower the Department to mandate candidates to compulsorily respond to one topic and attempt one case study in Marathi language, in addition to addressing such queries in English.
  • In the said circular, negative marking for wrong answers is also provided which is also beyond the jurisdiction of state Government.

Final order

In the light of aforesaid discussion, the following order was passed

(A) Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules has been invalidated on the basis that it diminishes the judiciary’s participation in the appointment procedure for the President and members of the State Commission and the District Commission. The ruling asserts that this particular rule contradicts the essence of the Constitution Bench decision in Rojer Mathew (supra).

(B) Since Rule 6(1) of the Rules of 2020 has been struck down, the notifications dated 10.04.2023 and 13.06.2023 would not survive.

(C) Rule 10(2) of the Rules of 2020 to the extent it prescribes the tenure of the Members of the State Commission and the President and members of the District Commission to be four years is struck down as not being in consonance with the spirit of the law laid down in the Madras Bar Association III (supra).

(D) Given that the re-appointment of members of the State Commission, the President, and members of the District Commission, as outlined in Rule 10(2) of the 2020 Rules, is contingent upon recommendations from the Selection Committee, and in light of the striking down of Rule 6(9) of the 2020 Rules in the case of Vijaykumar Bhima Dighe versus Union of India & Others [Public Interest Litigation No. 11 of 2021 along with Writ Petition No. 1096 of 2021], the Selection Committee is advised to follow the appointment procedure for Members of the State Commission, the President, and Members of the District Commission. This involves considering the past performance in accordance with Rule 8(18) of the 2019 Rules until such time that Rule 6(9) of the 2020 Rules is appropriately amended.

(E) The notice issued by the Department of Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs along with the advertisement dated 23.05.2023 in relation to Paper-II is held to be without jurisdiction. Department to re-conduct the test in Paper-II by following the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in The Secretary Ministry of Consumer AffairsVersus Dr.Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye & Others [2023 LiveLaw (SC) 161]. 

A request is made to temporarily suspend the execution of the judgment for a duration of eight weeks, allowing time for the filing of an appeal.

Narinder Chopra v/s Jaiprakash Associates (NC)

Narinder Chopra v/s Jaiprakash Associates (NC)

Narinder Chopra v/s Jaiprakash Associates (NC)

Consumer Complaint no 3258 0f 2017 along with IA 330 OF 2021 & IA 1130 OF 2021, Decided on 16.5.2021

Facts of the case

  • Consumer Complaint was instituted by Narinder Chopra on 7.11.2017 and admitted on 20.11.2017. Pleading completed ,evidence taken and matter comes to the  at the stage of argument.
  • Act 2019 came into force on  20.7.2020 repealing the earlier Consumer Protection Act 1986
  • Builder files interlocutory application no IA 5410 of 2020 for transferring the present complaint 3258 0f 2017 to appropriate commission. Application dismissed on 14.9.2020 stating therein that Act 2019 came into force with prospective effect and not retrospective in nature–transfer of case not allowed.
  • Builder files writ against the dismissal order of NCDRC.High Court of Delhi set aside order dated 14.9.2020 of NCDR with direction to commission to decide the issue on its own merits without influenced by administrative order dated 20 .7. 2020
  • Since no reason was given by the commission while dismissing interlocutory application ,NCDRS  on 22.12.2020 ordered to put the case before Hon’ble  President for necessary direction 15.1.2021 President rescues himself from the bench ,on 17.1 29021 directs the case to be put up before the bench on 2.7.2020 in which President J R K Agrawal is no more member
  • Now two more applications are clubbed with this application which were pending before this court against builder for dismissing his application for transfer of case.  

IA NO 330/12-CCNO 344/2019

IA NO 1190/21 FOR CCNO 2440/19

Bench heard the case on 29.1.2021,8.2.21,9.2/21&10.2.21

IA NO 5410/2020

Issues Raised

A matter involving question of law cannot be heard by a Bench with no judicial member.

Regulation 12 empowers the NCDRF President to constitute another bench with at least one judicial Member enabeling the bench to hear matter involving question of law

Pending matters be transferred to appropriate commission after enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction 

Issue 1- A matter involving question of law cannot be heard by a Bench with no judicial member

It is basically a Two fold issue

  1. A) Can this bench hear about the question of validity of bench

The question is whether this bench can examine the competency under the law if has been unlawfully constituted.

  • No bench can examine validity of constitution of bench or compostion of bench
  • No one can question kind minuts of Presidents about constitution of bench

The Commission held that the Bench can not and should not examine whether or not it lacks competency under law or if has been unlawfully constituted

“No Tribunal can examine act of its parent statute. Specifically, no Bench can examine validity of provisions relating to composition of this Commission or relating to constitution of its Benches by the Hon’ble President of the Commission ” the Bench observed

  1. B) Whether a bench must comprise of one judicial member if matter involves  any question of law to be decided .

power and authority may be exercised by the benches ; fixes no bar to exercise power. The senior most member is to preside over the bench which makes further clear there is no special mention of judicial member to be there mandatory

Chandra Kumar V/S  Union of India 18.3.1997 in which this issue was taken up with great concern .It held –

 “since now selection committee is headed by judges of Supreme court and nominated by CJI we have reason to believe that the committee would take care to ensure that administrative members are chosen from among those who have some background to deal with such cases

ISSUE -2 Regulation 12 empowers the NCDRF President to constitute another bench with at least one judicial Member enabling the bench to hear matter involving question of law 

Pointed out important word is “MAY”  which calls for debate whether bench has mandate  to refer the matter to president to constitute another  bench with judicial member or is on wisdom of bench

The Bench observed that it is at the considered wisdom of the Bench whether or not it considers appropriate and necessary to refer a matter to the President under Regulations 12.

ISSUE NO 3 Pending matters be transferred to appropriate commission after enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction

!) A similar question was dealt with by the NCDRC in its Judgment 8 April 2011 in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. which construed Amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from 15 March 2003. Relying on the earlier decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr Manoj Ramachandran, the NCDRC had held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction were prospective in nature.

!!)The transitional provisions contained in Sections 31, 45 and 56 expressly indicate that the adjudicatory personnel who were functioning as Members of the District Commission, SCDRC and NCDRC under the erstwhile legislation shall continue to hold office under the new legislation. Such provisions are necessary because persons appointed to the consumer fora under the Act of 1986 would have otherwise demitted office on the repeal of the legislation.Similar intend can be presumed for transfer of cases also when it is specifically mentioned in section 107 to continue with the same arrangement so far it is not inconsistent to the new act

!!!)At the end this commission also discussed that issue of pecuniary jurisdiction is “abeling as well disabeling” because criteria to calculate pecuniary jurisdiction is also changed in the new act . In earlier act criteria was cost paid plus compensation to be calculated where sa in the present act only cost paid is to be considered . With this calculation total amount to be considered will be Rs 9731017  and entitlement will be District commission It will gravely prejudiced to consumer as they will lose valuable statutary right to appeal/revision allowed to them under the act .

With the above view IA 5410-2020 DISMISSED by the bench

Related

SC Re-affirms Stand on Healthcare Service under Consumer Law

SC Re-affirms Stand on Healthcare Service under Consumer Law

SC Re-affirms Stand on Healthcare Service under Consumer Law

The Supreme Court in the case of Medicos Legal Action Group v Union of India said, “We are of the clear opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioning Trust, of the Hon’ble Minister having made certain statements in course of parliamentary debates on the Bill that preceded the 2019 Act, is of little relevance.” From the pleadings it was found that ‘health care’ was initially included in the definition of the term ‘service’ appearing in the Bill but after extensive debates, the same was deleted. Mere repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2019 Act would not result in exclusion of ‘health care’ services rendered by doctors to patients.

                           Dr Prem Lata Legal Head VOICE

In the context of the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act, the definition of “service” having been read, understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Indian Medical Association (supra) to include services rendered by a medical practitioner to his patient upon acceptance of fees/charges. However, an organization “Medicos Legal Action Group”, had filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay as  Public Interest Litigation No. 58 Of 2021  and prayed before the court to declare  that services performed by healthcare service providers are not included within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and also  for mandamus directing all consumer fora within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court not to accept complaints filed under the 2019 Act against healthcare service providers.

Grounds for such an appeal were given as:

  • That parliamentary debates on the Consumer Protection Bill, 2018 preceding the 2019 Act led to exclusion of ‘healthcare’ from the definition of the term “service” as defined in the Bill.
  • That the Hon’ble Minister for Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, had stated on the floor of the Parliament that ‘healthcare’ had been deliberately kept out of the 2019 Act for the reasons cited therefore. This clearly indicates the parliamentary intent of not including ‘health care’ within the definition of “service” in the 2019 Act.
  • That the 2019 Act having been brought into force upon repeal of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 registration of complaints, which are filed against doctors, by the consumer fora in the State of Maharashtra is illegal and should be declared as such.

On the above points raised by the trust, a detailed discussions were held in the high court and definition of service in both the acts was re-examined to make the things clear. Reading the two definitions, court did not see any material difference between the two. Except inclusion of ‘telecom’ in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act, the terms of the definition were identical.

Section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act did not in terms include services rendered by doctors within the term “service”, but such definition was considered by the Supreme Court in its decision in Indian Medical Association Vs. V. P. Shantha & Ors., and it was held-

  • Service rendered to a patient by a medical practitioner charging fee by way of consultation, diagnosis and treatment, both medicinal and surgical, would fall within the ambit of ‘service’ as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act.
  • Medical Council of India and/or State Medical Councils constituted under the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act would not exclude the services rendered by them from the ambit of the Act.
  • Services rendered free of charges to some but charged from other patients by the same hospital /nursing home is also covered as rendering service.
  • Where, as a part of the conditions of service, the employer bears the expenses of medical treatment of an employee and his family members dependent on him, the service rendered to such an employee and his family members also falls under these services.

Court on the basis of definition above examined held that, “Merely because of enactment of the 2019 Act upon repeal of the 1986 Act as well as the parliamentary debates, the efficacy of the law laid down in the decision in Indian Medical Association (supra) as a binding precedent would not stand eroded. This is a thoroughly misconceived Public Interest Litigation and we have no doubt that it deserves outright dismissal”.

Medicos Legal Action Group had approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition challenging the Bombay High Court’s judgment delivered in October 2021. The Supreme Court on Friday held that doctors and healthcare services are not excluded from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act 2019.

A bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli affirmed the petitioner based its case on a statement reportedly made by the Union Minister while introducing the Consumer Protection Bill 2018 that health care services are not covered under it. The bench said that the Minister’s statement cannot restrict the ambit of the statute.

Justice DY Chandrachud remarked, “The definition of ‘Service’ is wide enough under the Act. If the Parliament wanted to exclude, they would have said it expressly. The reason why healthcare was deleted was because the definition of the expression of service was wide enough. The Minister’s speech in the house cannot restrict the ambit of the Act while laying emphasis on the word ‘Service of any description’.”

He also added, “We will affirm the judgment of the High Court. It’s a very guarded statement of the Minister also. The Minister is also saying that we have included but not expressly included in it.” 

Relevance of Speeches in the Parliament

Supreme Court cited earlier cases wherein parliamentary speeches were in question.

 In the case of State of Travancore-Cochin vs. Bombay Co., SC Hon’ble Patanjali Shastri, CJI held, “A speech made in the course of debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it would not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill, nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.”

Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, ruled, “Speeches made on the floor of the Parliament are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions.”

State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, Hon’ble B.P. Sinha, CJI held, “A statute is the expression of the collective intention of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.”

While concluding, the SC in clear terms indicated that the parliamentarians might have thought of not including `health care’ as that would have amounted to a mere surplus.

“If at all the Parliament while repealing and replacing the 1986 Act with the 2019 Act had intended to give a meaning to the term ‘service’ different from the one given by the Supreme Court, such intention ought to have been reflected in clear words by a specific exclusion of ‘health care’ from the purview of the 2019 Act. While construing a statute, what has not been said is equally important as what has been said.”

 

Related

Whether medical examination is compulsory for issuance of Policy to take place prior to accepting premium

Whether medical examination is compulsory for issuance of Policy to take place prior to accepting premium

Whether medical examination is compulsory for issuance of Policy to take place prior to accepting premium, was the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court Bench in view of the facts and circumstances of the case that the insurance company accepted the premium, waived the condition precedent of medical examination. In such circumstances, the Respondent Insurance Company could not reject the claim on the ground that the medical examination of insurer was not done and  the Contract of Insurance was not complete.

Dr Prem Lata (Legal Head VOICE)

 

Supreme Court had held in the above case 

“In the instant case there was a complete contract as there was clear presumption of the acceptance of the proposal in favour of the proposer”

SC further observed 

“The specific condition in the policy was that in case the loan amount exceeds Rs.7.5 lacs the medical examination was compulsory. That if the medical examination was compulsory for such cases it should have been done along with filing of the proposal form before the payment of the premium. If the proposal was not accepted for any reason the premium would have been credited to the account of the proposer. The premium has not been refunded. From this, it is clear that the insurance company had not rejected the proposal.”

Facts leading to dispute 

Brief Facts of the case:

Consumer, his wife and son Mr. D. Venugopal had obtained a housing loan of Rs.30,00,000/- from Life Insurance Company for construction of a house in Hyderabad. The proposal was accompanied by good health declaration by the insured. D. Venugopal expired in 2009. Consequently, the said life insurance obtained in his name came into force, obligating the insurer to pay the outstanding amount in their loan account. The consumer approached the insurer and the bank informing them about the demise of D. Venugopal and requested them to settle the insurance claim and to discharge the outstanding loan amount in their house loan account. Since the insurer did not accede to his request, he filed a consumer complaint before the State Commission.

The insurer contested the complaint mainly on the ground that the proposal for the policy was not accepted as the insured did not present himself for medical examination in spite of repeated requests made by the insurer. Thus, the insurer pleaded no deficiency in service and denied its liability in connection with the payment to the insured. The State Commission allowed the complaint. However, the National Commission, by majority, allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the National Commission’s order, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court

The respondents company  have contended that there is no concluded contract between the parties. Therefore, the insurer was not bound to discharge loan merely on the ground of receipt of premium for issuing policy. The deceased did not appear for medical examination. Therefore, the policy could not be completed on receipt of the death intimation.

But Supreme Court did not agree to he contention of Insurance company and concluded-

  1. The insurance contract being a contract of utmost good faith, is a two-way door. The standards of conduct as expected under the utmost good faith obligation should be met by either party to such contract.
  2. The condition precedent for acceptance of the premium was the medical examination. It would be logical for the insurance company  to accept the premium based on the medical examination and not otherwise. Therefore, by the very fact that they accepted the premium waived the condition precedent of medical examination.
  3. The rejection of the policy must be made in a reasonable time so as to be fair and in consonance with the good faith standards. In the case, it could not be held that such enormous delay was reasonable. With reference to the facts of the present case, the Court remarked that the premium was paid in 2008. That it was only in 2011 that the respondent insurance company informed the appellant that the policy was not accepted by them.

Supreme Court made a law by this judgment that Insurance company is equally under obligation to follow their terms and rules while issuing the policy only then they should expect insured to follow rules. In case they ignored some procedure they are bound to approve the claim 

QUOTATIONS FROM LANDMARK JUDGMENTS (June-2022)

QUOTATIONS FROM LANDMARK JUDGMENTS (June-2022)

1. “We are of the clear opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioning Trust, of the Hon’ble Minister having made certain statements in course of parliamentary debates on the Bill that preceded the 2019 Act, is of little relevance. From the pleadings it is found that ‘health care’ was initially included in the definition of the term “service” appearing in the Bill but after extensive debates, the same was deleted. Mere repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2019 Act would not result in exclusion of ‘health care’ services rendered by doctors to patients from the definition of the term ‘service’”Held by Supreme Court 

2. “Merely because of enactment of the 2019 Act upon repeal of the 1986 Act as well as the parliamentary debates, the efficacy of the law laid down in the decision in Indian Medical Association (supra) as a binding precedent would not stand eroded.”

3. “The definition of “Service” is wide enough under the Act. If the Parliament wanted to exclude, they would have said it expressly,” “Reason why healthcare was deleted was because the definition of the expression of service was wide enough. The Minister’s speech in the house cannot restrict the ambit of the Act. while laying emphasis on the word, “Service of any description.”

Medicos Legal Action Group v Union of India| SLP (Civil) 19374/2021

4. “ a speech made in the course of debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it would not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill, nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.”

State of Travancore-Cochin vs. Bombay Co. 11-PIL-58-2021 8 Ltd., reported in AIR 1952 SC  Hon’ble Patanjali Shastri, CJI held

5.  “Speeches made on the floor of the Parliament are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions

Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, reported in AIR 1952 SC 369 Ruled

6. “A statute is the expression of the collective intention of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute”

State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241, Hon’ble B.P. Sinha, CJI 

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